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Abstract  The costs of the dangers of commercial fishing are very high, yet fish-
ing vessel safety regulations are frequently met with lack of enthusiasm or even
rejection by fishers. Why would fishers reject regulations designed to increase
their safety? There is a strong possibility that some of the rejection is the result
of lack of cognitive sharing and communication between originators of the regu-
lations and the fishers for whom the regulations are designed. This paper
examines the pattern of cognition about danger of the occupation among fishers
and relates these patterns to sociocultural differences in two southern New En-
gland ports. The intent of the study is to help bridge the gap between regulators
and users by providing culturally appropriate information that can be used to
design more effective policy, training, and enforcement programs.
Key words  Cognition of fishers, culturally appropriate regulations, danger
of fishing, maritime anthropology, New England fishers, safety regulations.
Introduction
The dangers involved in commercial fishing at sea are costly to both the individuals
involved and society as a whole (National Research Council 1991). Every year
many fishers are injured and lose their lives at sea; expensive equipment is damaged
or lost; and a costly rescue service must be maintained to respond to vessels in dis-
tress. Fishing vessel safety regulations have been implemented to reduce these costs,
but they also result in costs to the fishers in terms of new equipment and training,
and to society in terms of enforcement. What many find difficult to understand,
however, is the fishers’ unenthusiastic response to these attempts to improve their
safety. Mandated equipment is purchased but too often ignored or improperly de-
ployed. EPIRBs provide a good example. An EPIRB is an emergency positioning
device which automatically transmits a message when immersed in water. The mes-
sage includes a code, which identifies the vessel (if the EPIRB is registered), and
the exact location is triangulated by satellites which receive the message. Required
EPIRBs are sometimes not registered, they are not placed in their brackets where
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they will automatically float free of the boat if the boat capsizes (e.g., they are put in
a drawer in the wheelhouse to prevent theft and not redeployed when the ship is at
sea), or their batteries not checked as required (for other examples see Poggie, et al.
1995). Additionally, safety training is delayed as long as possible with the rational-
ization that “we already know what to do.” Binkley reported that many Nova Scotia
fishers she interviewed said they all knew the right answers when examined in a
safety course, but they did not believe what they were taught (1991:181). Is this a
problem in communication?
Anthropologists have long maintained the view that it is essential to understand
the perspective or world view of “others” if we wish to communicate with a high
degree of cognitive sharing. Otherwise, it is argued, people with different world
views will talk past each other and very little communication will take place. A
negative example of this principle at work was observed while attending a public
hearing on New England fisheries management where a government biologist was
reporting, primarily to fishers in the audience, the results of a study where random
sampling was used to ascertain the size of fish populations in an area slated for man-
agement restrictions. A fisher, whose livelihood could be adversely affected by the
results being reported, stood up and said that he did not want his livelihood threat-
ened by the randomness involved in the “flipping of a coin.” To him random meant a
“flip of the coin,” a haphazard method. Both the biologist and fisher were being
honest and well-intentioned and were trying to do their jobs to the best of their abili-
ties; however, they were not communicating because they did not share the same
cognition regarding the meaning of the concept of random.
The two men in this example belong to two different sub-cultures, with different
sets of ideas that impede cross-cultural communication. Applied anthropologists
(and others) have worked for many decades to provide necessary information on the
thinking of “others” to help facilitate better cross-cultural understanding and com-
munication. Recently in informal interviews with Southern New England fishers
about newly instituted safety regulations, we have heard many statements reminis-
cent of the fisher and the biologist episode. These statements indicate to us that a
considerable degree of non-sharing exists in regard to the dangers of fishing that
new regulations are designed to address. It is also apparent that there are differences
among fishers with respect to these views. Intracultural variation in attitudes, be-
liefs, and values among fishers has been described for several domains (e.g., Poggie
1992; Gatewood and McCay 1990; Pollnac and Poggie 1988), and many anthropolo-
gists have been led to expect this type of variation as a normal part of human culture
(Pelto and Pelto 1975). It is important that regulators, and others who deal with fish-
ing safety issues, better understand perceptions of fishers concerning safety hazards
if they wish to communicate well and maximize the impacts of safety regulations
and safety training programs. As in the case of assessing stocks recounted above,
what is needed is a better understanding of this domain of the sub-culture of com-
mercial fishing (see also Smith 1990; Poggie, et al. 1995). It is also important to
identify specific categories of fishers whose views on safety hazards could most
benefit from safety training programs.
The purpose of this paper is to determine the sociocultural correlates of differ-
ences in evaluation of factors associated with the danger of commercial fishing acci-
dents among fishers in Southern New England. It is anticipated that fishers’ evalua-
tions of the relative importance of different causal factors will be useful to personnel
interested in promoting fishing vessel safety. This information should facilitate the
development of culturally appropriate training and enforcement programs.
Potential correlates of variance in fishers’ perceptions of commercial fishing ac-
cidents were identified from previous research, participant observation, and key in-
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include a fisher’s age and fishing experience (see also Binkley 1991; Pollnac and
Poggie 1990), type of fishing (see also Binkley 1991; McCay 1991; McCay, et al.
1989) including days at sea and distance from port, whether or not a vessel is owner
operated, the kinship status of crew members, whether or not a crew uses transients,
formal education (including technical training), and home port (see also Pollnac and
Poggie 1990). Sociocultural correlates of differences in evaluation of causal factors
can lead to identification of subgroups manifesting differential perceptions of dan-
gers in the occupation, enabling the development of intervention programs tailored
to the needs of specific groups of individuals.
Causes of Accidents
A number of variables have been identified in the literature as being associated with
fishing vessel accidents (cf. National Research Council 1991). To develop a list of
culturally appropriate variables with regional significance, the present research de-
rived potential causes of fishing accidents from in-depth interviews with local fish-
ers, Coast Guard personnel, fishing vessel accident investigators, and fishing vessel
safety training personnel. Variables most salient to those interviewed (e.g., given
most emphasis and/or mentioned most frequently) were selected for further analysis
(table 1). Items specifically mentioned as influencing accidents to fishers (personnel
accidents) were kept separate from those impacting the vessel. There is, of course,
overlap between the two lists, but since informants discussed them separately in the




As part of a larger interview schedule, fishers were requested to evaluate, in terms
of relative importance in causing accidents, each of the fourteen items listed in table
1. Each fisher ranked each item on a five point scale ranging from (1) unimportant
to (5) very important. A random sample of 121 fishers, representative of the differ-
ent types of fishing found in Point Judith, Rhode Island (N = 41) and New Bedford,
Massachusetts (N = 80) were interviewed.
Table 1
Variables influencing commercial fishing accidents.
Variables Affecting Accidents
To Fishermen To Fishing Vessel
Fisherman’s age Location of boat
Fisherman’s job on board Day versus night
Location on board vessel Visibility
Vessel age Windspeed
Time of year Sea conditions
Vessel size Hull type
Carelessness Captain or crew errorPoggie, Pollnac, and Van Dusen 26
Table 3
Factor Analysis of Causal Items.
CAUSE1 CAUSE2 CAUSE3
Fisherman’s job on board 0.67 0.13 –0.25
Fisherman’s age 0.63 –0.01 0.05
Hull type 0.63 0.16 0.09
Location on board vessel 0.57 0.21 0.07
Visibility 0.41 0.12 0.20
Vessel age 0.39 –0.24 0.22
Sea conditions –0.01 0.89 0.07
Windspeed 0.13 0.83 0.09
Location of boat 0.36 0.43 0.24
Time of year 0.08 0.40 –0.10
Vessel size 0.27 0.29 0.16
Carelessness –0.07 0.05 0.73
Human error 0.20 –0.01 0.73
Day versus night 0.10 0.04 0.54
Percent total variance 15.5 14.8 11.7
Analysis
As a first step in the analysis of the data derived from this task, modal rank and per-
cent responding with this rank for each of the fourteen causal items were calculated.
Results of this analysis are in table 2.
Fishers’ responses to all items varied between “not at all important (score = 1)
and “very important” (score = 5). Items with modal values of four and above in
table 2 are clearly considered by fishers as important causal factors associated with
accidents. The most significant aspect of the data used to produce table 2, however,
is the amount of variation fishers manifested with respect to their responses. Analy-
ses presented below focus on factors influencing the variation in response patterns.
The next step in the analysis is based on the assumption that covariance in the
perception of relative importance of factors influencing fishing accidents can be
used to define sets of interrelated accident causes which can improve our under-
standing of fishers’ conceptualization of risk. Principal component factor analysis
with varimax rotation of factors was used to determine patterns in variability in
evaluations of the fourteen causal items. The scree-test, which limits factors derived
on the basis of a leveling-out of percent of total variance explained, was used to de-
fine number of factors (Cattell 1966). Based on this test three factors were derived.
Table 3 displays the results of this part of the analysis.
Table 2
Fishers’ Perceptions of Importance of Variables Associated with Fishing Accidents
Variables Affecting Accidents
To Fishermen Mode (%) To Fishing Vessel Mode (%)
Fisherman’s age 1 (37) Location of boat 3 (30)
Fisherman’s job on board 1 (31) Day versus night 1 (28)
Location on board vessel 5 (49) Visibility 5 (57)
Vessel age 3 (27) Windspeed 5 (50)
Time of year 5 (63) Sea conditions 5 (51)
Vessel size 3 (31) Hull type 1 (50)
Carelessness 5 (75) Captain/crew error 5 (52)New England Fishers’ Cognition of Danger 27
Items in table 3 are arranged in terms of magnitude of loading on the three fac-
tors. For example, the first six items have their highest loadings on factor one
(CAUSE1), with fishers’ job on board having the highest loading and vessel age the
lowest. The next five items have their highest loadings on factor two (CAUSE2),
and the final three, on factor three (CAUSE3).
Except for visibility, items that loaded highest on factor one are intrinsic to the
vessel, fisher, or fisher’s job. CAUSE1, therefore seems to be composed of items
that can be labeled as “internal.” Conceptualizing the factor as “internal” suggests
that “visibility,” as a concept, belongs to the factor since it links the internal with
the external.
Factor two is clearly composed of external items: sea conditions, windspeed,
time of year, and vessel location. Vessel size has a relatively low loading on factor
two, almost the same as its loading on factor one; hence, it can be considered as a
shared item. Factor three appears to be related to human decision making. Human
error and carelessness both involve decisions; and nighttime, the time usually de-
voted to sleep, affects the decision making ability of many people.
Item loadings of the three factors are plotted in the three dimensional causal
factor space in figure 1. Time of day, human error, and carelessness are clustered
low, in the far right corner of the space. Externalities such as wind, seas, and season
are high in the near right quadrant. Fisher’s job, work location, age, and hull type
are clustered in the near left corner, and visibility, which links the external with the
internal, is at moderate height in the center of the factor space.
Standardized factor scores were calculated for each fisher in the sample on each
factor. These factor scores reflect the relative importance attributed to each item
weighted according to the item’s factor loading. Hence, a fisher with a high factor
score for CAUSE1, rated the internal causal items as relatively important. Correla-
Figure 1.  Plot of Items in Three-Dimensional Factor SpacePoggie, Pollnac, and Van Dusen 28
tions between factor scores for fishers on each factor and the sociocultural and tech-
nical variables proposed as influencing perceptions of factors contributing to fishing
accidents are found in table 4.
The correlations in table 4 indicate that fishers on scallopers, larger vessels,
vessels with larger crews, and vessels that take trips of longer duration are more
likely to ascribe a higher level of importance to internal, potential accident causes
(CAUSE1). All the variables correlated with CAUSE1 are also highly correlated
with fishing from a scallop vessel. This set of variables is so highly intercorrelated
(the four predictor variables have much higher correlations with each other than
with the dependent variable) that the potential for multicollinearity makes it im-
proper to use multiple regression to determine the most important predictor variable.
Further, the correlation between scalloper and CAUSE1 is not significantly different
from the correlations between the other three independent variables (crew size,
maximum days, and vessel length; t = 0.91, 0.99, and 0.14, respectively; all p >
0.20) and CAUSE1; hence, we cannot make any decisions as to the “most impor-
tant” based on the size of the correlation coefficient. Vessel conditions, location and
job on board all impact exposure to danger on a scalloper with the tons of metal
chain dredging gear swinging over and falling to the deck. Dragger fishers tend to
rank internal items lower in terms of importance in causing accidents.
Correlates of CAUSE2 (the external dimension) are interesting. Home port
(Point Judith) has the strongest correlation. The other three strong correlates (educa-
tion, maximum days, and lobster fishing) are themselves significantly correlated
with home port (r = 0.30, –0.72, and 0.46 respectively; all p < 0.01). When port is
controlled, however, the partial correlations between CAUSE2 and the two indepen-
dent variables maximum days and lobster fishing drop a great deal (–0.10, p = 0.33
Table 4
Zero-Order Correlations Between Independent Variables and Factor Scores.
Independent Variable CAUSE1 CAUSE2 CAUSE3
Age –0.08 0.06 –0.05
Education 0.05 –0.22* 0.22*
Children –0.11 –0.02 –0.01
Kin/crew 0.13 0.04 –0.03
Married –0.15 –0.02 –0.10
Crew Size 0.35** 0.12 –0.18
Dependents –0.10 –0.01 –0.05
Home port –0.06 –0.34** 0.38**
Position 0.02 0.15 –0.04
Maximum days 0.24** 0.27** –0.29**
Maximum distance 0.05 0.15 –0.33**
Owner-operated –0.11 –0.12 0.32**
Crew changes 0.10 –0.09 –0.11
Transients 0.03 0.07 –0.09
Vessel length 0.30** 0.16 –0.11
Dragger –0.31** 0.01 –0.04
Scalloper 0.31** 0.13 –0.06
Lobster boat 0.03 –0.23* 0.17
Years fishing –0.06 0.01 0.01
Safety trained 0.02 –0.12 0.16
Technical training 0.11 0.02 –0.05
* = p < 0.05, ** = p < 0.01New England Fishers’ Cognition of Danger 29
and 0.05, p = 0.63 respectively), and the correlation with education drops only
slightly (r = 0.16, p = 0.10). This suggests that the more education fishers have the
more likely they are to see external conditions as being unimportant—internal vari-
ables such as technology and the human decision maker can compensate. But, it also
appears that the longer one is uninterruptedly battered by the elements,1 as evi-
denced by longer trips, the more likely one is to evaluate external variables as sig-
nificant factors affecting fishing accidents.
Patterning of these same two variables (education and trip length) with
CAUSE3 (the human decision making dimension) seems to support this explanation.
The more educated are more likely to ascribe importance to human decision making.
Length of exposure to the elements, however, results in more emphasis on the exter-
nal factors and less on the human as influencing accidents. It appears that the longer
the exposure to nature, the less importance ascribed to the impacts of human deci-
sions. Using this same logic, distance from port probably increases one’s feeling of
being under the control of nature as opposed to the human mind.
The positive correlation of CAUSE3 with fishing from an owner-operated vessel
is quite interesting. Perhaps, the owner operator being on board, constantly aware of the
impacts of human error on his personal property and impressing his concerns on the
crew, impacts their thinking about the importance of human error and carelessness.
Discussion
Given these patterns of thinking2 concerning the importance of variables affecting
accidents, we can ask the question, “Which of these patterns of belief about causes
are closest to the actual pattern of accidents?” To answer this question the best
source of statistical information comes from the United States Coast Guard’s
CASMAIN data file. Data for comparison were derived from the Coast Guard’s fish-
ing vessel casualty data file (CASMAIN) from District 1, the Northeast sector for
the years 1980 to 1991. The computer files containing these data were obtained from
the Coast Guard under the Freedom of Information Act. Analysis of this data indi-
cates that in terms of accidents resulting in total loss of vessel, the main reported
causal factor is human error, followed by what have been termed here internal
causes. External factors appear to be least important as causes of total vessel loss.
While it is true that we did not complicate our question by specifying the exact type
of accident, we feel that “total loss” is the most salient type of accident; hence, the
accident most likely conceptualized when responding to our generalized questions.
The findings presented here suggest that interventions, such as training pro-
grams, can be designed to have maximal impact in topical areas where specific
groups of fishers have perceptions which differ from what data suggest are impor-
tant causal factors in fishing accidents. For example, the significant negative rela-
tionship between trip length (both distance and time) and identification of human
decision making as a factor in accidents, suggests that this aspect should be stressed
in training programs directed at fishers in long trip fisheries. This not only makes
sense, but it would be a more appropriate allocation of training time.
Our participant observation research has led to the conclusion that commercial
1 Years fishing evidently does not have the same effect. Short trips, interrupted by periods ashore, appar-
ently results in a much more benign perception of the oceanic environment than that engendered by pro-
longed, constant exposure.
2 Informal discussions with several fishing captains from the area lend support to the findings presented
here. It should be noted that lack of agreement on the part of the same group of captains would not ne-
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fishers often deal with danger in their occupation by denial and unrealistic evalua-
tion of potential impacts of various accident types (see Pollnac, Poggie, and
VanDusen 1995). By denying and unrealistically evaluating danger they may be
buffering themselves from the immediate psychological stress of working in a high
danger environment; but at the same time, they may be creating an unrealistic men-
tal environment for themselves where real danger is not being adequately addressed.
Research directed at understanding fishers’ cognition of danger can be used to de-
velop training programs providing rational techniques for coping with the all-too-
real dangers associated with commercial fishing.
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